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SUMMARY 
Central to the findings of the 
Intergovernmental Pand on Climate 
Change (IPCC) third assessment report, 
released in Shanghai in January 2001, 
was the statement: 
%err is now new and stmngcr~~dencc 
that most of the warming observed over 
the last 50 ycars is attributable to human 
acrivida." 
This represents a significant 
strengthening of the analogous statement 
issued by the IPCC in 1996: 
"The balance of evidence suggests a 
discernible human influence on global 
dimate" 
In this artide the scientific 
evidence leading up to these IPCC 
statements is reviewed. A historical 
perspective of the Earth's climate over 
the last 400,000 ycm is presented, as is 
the science of global warming over the 
last 200 years. The range of projections 
of climate change over the next century 
is also summarized giving particular 
emphasis to projmions concerning 
Canada. The issue of uncerrainty in 
climate change projections is tackled 
and the public confusion arising from 
the media portrayal of the science and 
its entry into the political arena 
d i s d .  Finally, The Kyoto Protocol 
and how it fits within the framework of 
necessary actions rquired to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions is reviewed. 
SOMMAIRE 
Point focal d a  dkcouvertes dkcrites dans 
le troisitmc rapport du Gmupc d'cxpew 
intergouvernemental sur I'hrolution du 
climat (GIEC), publik Shangai en 
janvier 2001, on retrouve cette 
dCdararion essentielle : * I1 existe 
maintenant d a  indications nouvelles et 
plus convaincantes que la plupart d a  
indices de rtchauffement ayant fait 
I'objet d'obscrvations au cours des 
derniers 50 ans sont anribuables aux 
activitts humaines x. 
G l a  constitue un rcnforcement 
significatif d'une dtclaration similaire 
publitc en 1996 par lc GIEC : * Le biian 
des preuves considtrtes porte penser 
que !c c h a r  planttaire serait influend 
par des causes d'origine humaine x. 
Le prtsent article porte sur 
I'ensemble des ClCments de preuve 
scicntifique sous-jacent aux dkclarations 
de ces deux dtclarations du GIEC. 
Dans une perspective historique, on y 
prtscnte les fluctuations climatiques de 
la planhe au cours des derniers 400 000 
ans, ainsi que l a  principales etapes du 
dheloppement dc la science du 
rgchauffement au cours des derniers 200 
ans. On  passe en rewe la gamme des 
projections des changements climatiques 
pour le prochain sitcle, particuliPrement 
en ce qui concerne le Canada. On 
discute du probl$mc de I'incertitudc des 
projections de changements climatiques, 
de la confusion du public dans le 
contme de I'iage de la science dtpeint 
par les mMias ainsi que de I'tmergence 
du sujn dans I'artne politique. 
Finalement, le protowle dc Kyoto at 
revu, surrout en ce qui a tnit aux 
actions requises pour rtduire I'6mission 
de gaz i. effet de serre. 
NmOaKnm 
Canadians are obsessed with weather, it 
:erned 
differenc 
often nc 
variability and ics affect on cvcrvrhine 
we do. We arc also greatly con< 
with our climate, although the 
bco~een weather and climate is 
well understood by the public. by 
definition, climate is the statistics of 
weather including, for cxample, in  mcan 
and variance. A torrential downpour is 
an individual weather event, whereas the 
likelihood of its occurrence in any given 
year is an aspect of our dimate that is 
derived from long term avenges of 
many individual weather evencs. 
When we discuss climate change, 
we are discussing the change in the 
statistics of weather. The term Global 
Warming has been used to specifically 
refer to the increase in the Earth's global 
mean temperature as a consequence of 
the increased atmospheric loading of 
greenhouse gases arising tiom fossil Fuel 
combustion. The basic physics of global 
warming is not complicated and is long 
established in the scientific literature. 
The interesting science questions 
concern how dimate change will 
influence the regional statistics of 
wearher, and so-called feedback 
mechanisms that may affect the 
magnimde of these changes. 
Conveying the significance of 
dimate change to the public is a difficult 
task for scientists. In the summer of 
2002, for example, much media 
attention was given to the torrential 
rainfals and flooding in Europe and 
India. At the same time, the Canadian 
prairie farmers were suffering one of 
the worst droughu on record. The 
dilemma is that when asked: "Are thae  
evenu caused by global warming", the 
scientist must rapond with a long 
discussion of weather, climate and the 
relationship between the statistics of 
weather and climate. The media simply 
want a yes or no answer. We will never 
be able to say that a particular weather 
event is caused by climate change. 
Rather, what science can offer is a 
quantification of the change in the 
likelihood of such an event. For 
example, an expected 20-year return 
precipitation event in the present 
climate may become a 10-year return 
event and, after a few more decades, a 
5-year return event under climate 
change. 
Similarly, during February 2003, 
a cold spell in eastern Canada likely 
caused some to ponder what this talk 
about global warming was really all 
about; at the same time some in British 
Columbia and Alaska were likely 
convinced that the warm February was 
more proof of global warming. Few 
would examine the typical atmospheric 
planetary wave teleconnection patterns 
associated with El Niiio conditions in 
the tropical Pacific. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that 
climate change is upon us. The reality is 
that even if we dramatically cut fossil 
fuel emissions today, we have warming 
in store for centuries due to the slow 
response time of the climate system. 
The relevant policy question becomes: 
What do we as a collective society deem 
to be an acceptable level of climate 
change? 
It is clear that future projections 
of climate change share common 
themes. There will be amplified 
warming at high latitudes relative to the 
tropical latitudes, in the northern 
relative to southern hemisphere, in the 
winter relative to summer, over land 
relative to ocean and at nighr relarive ro 
day. There will be an increase in mid- 
and high-latitude precipitation, 
especially in the winter and spring, 
although with warmer tcmperatures and 
hence later winter freezes and earlier 
spring thaws, one might expect a larger 
component of this to be in the form of 
rain rather than snow. There will be an 
increase in extreme precipitation events 
over large parts of mid to high latituda. 
Despite this, there will be an increased 
likelihood of summer drought. There 
will be a large-scale retreat of most of 
the world's glaciers with less short-term 
impact on the Greenland and Antarctic 
ice sheets. Sea ice in the Arctic will 
melt back significantly in the summer. 
Throughout the history of 
humans, weather and its climate have 
influenced the rise and M1 of 
civilizarions and the livelihood and 
economic well being of their people 
(Diamond, 1997). So what is different 
between then and now? Technology and 
population increase. In the past. 
humans did not have the economic or 
technological wherewithal to rapidly 
adapt to the challenges posed by 
changes in the statistics of weather. 
Today large-scale irrigation, fertilization 
and land management techniques have 
substantially improved the adaptive 
strategies of developed nations to 
weather and climate fluctuations. The 
2002 prairie drought may be one of the 
worst in our meteorological record, but 
it certainly pales in comparison to the 
dust bowl years earlier last century in 
terms of its affect on Canadian society. 
Unfortunately, the popular 
perception of what constitutes a 
'normal' climate often relies on an 
individual's memory of climate 
conditions. This in rurn depends on 
where one lives and on one's ability to 
accurately remember conditions from 
dccada earlier. To the people living in 
early 19" century England, a normal 
climate would be one in which the 
Thames River would freeze over 
allowing for festivities at the annual 
Frost Fair (Fig. 1). If the Thames were 
to freeze over today, it would be 
considered a freak event. 
In January 2001, the United 
Nations Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) reledsed a 
report emphasizing that there is now 
new and stronger evidence &at most of 
the climate warming observed over the 
last 50 years is attributable to human 
activities. This strong statement, by the 
world's leading climate scientists, sent a 
signal to governments that informed 
policy is urgently needed to determine a 
course of action for the future. To set 
this target, researchers must attempt to 
reduce uncertainty in climate 
projections and quantify the socio- 
economic impacts of climate change. 
They must also develop the policies and 
mitigation technologies that will most 
effectively achieve appropriate levels of 
net greenhouse gas emissions, and 
develop the adaptation strategies that 
will respond to the consequences 
Pigurc 1 T h e  last Frost Fair on rheTharncs River, January 31-February 5, 1814 (from 
Manlev, 1952). 
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resulting From those choices. Perhaps 
most important is the need for a move 
towards the development of new energy 
technologies, which will require a re- 
emergence of new and safer nudear 
power technologies and the greatly 
expanded use of sustainable energy 
sources (e.g., wind, solar, geothermal) 
combined with a move to widespread 
use of hydrogen-based energy storage 
systems. 
In this review, the science of 
dimare change will be examined, 
starting with a discussion of the 200 
year history of the science and leading 
up to our present-day understanding of 
the issue of global warming. S i c e  much 
of the observational evidence and fume 
projections of climate change are 
derived from the IPCC Third 
Assessment Report, a brief review of 
the history M i n d  the formation of the 
IPCC is given. Climate change 
detection and attribution, whereby an 
anthropogenic (human-induced) 
warming signature is searched for above 
a background of natural variability is 
also covered. This is followed by a 
summary and concluding remarks. 
HISTORY OF THE SCIENCE OF 
GLOBAL WARMING 
A common misconception is that the 
link between increasing levels of 
atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO*) and 
global warming has only recently been 
realized. In fact, Dr. James Hansen of 
NASA's Goddard Institute for Space 
Studies is often credited in the media as 
being the "father of climate change 
theory" (e.g., Global warming: The 
clouds thicken, by Peter Foster, National 
Post, Aug. 19, 2000; Global warming 
fears cool off. Why impose questionable 
constraints on economic growth? by 
Peter Holle, Winnipeg Free Press, Jan. 
27, 2001). This labeling has apparently 
occurred in response to Hansen being 
called before the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources to testify on June 23, 1988. 
At that time he argued rhat he was 99% 
confident that the greenhouse effect had 
been detected and that it was changing 
our climate. 
This now famous testimony 
occurred nearly 100 years after the link 
was drawn between carbon dioxide and 
the Earth's temperature (see 
Christianson, 1999 for a historical 
review). Nevertheless, it was one of the 
firsr times rhe issue directly entered the 
U.S. political arena and so received a 
high profile in the media. 
In fact in 1824, Jean-Baptiste- 
Joseph Fourier (a well-known French 
mathematician) introduced the 
hypothesis that the atmosphere blocks 
outgoing radiation from the Earth and 
re-radiates a portion of it badt, thereby 
warming the planet (Fourier, 1824). 
Swedish Nobel Laureate Svante 
Arrhenius drew upon the work of 
Fourier, as well as that of American 
astronomer Samud Langley and Irish 
scientist John Tyndall, to develop in 
1896 the first theoretical modd of how 
atmospheric CO2 affects the Euth's 
tempcrature (Arrhenius, 1896). In 
1938, the British coal engineer George 
Callendar argued that since l880 the 
Earth had warmed by about l0F, and he 
predicted that this would double in the 
next half century. 
In a seminal paper by Revdle 
and Suess (1957), it was argued that the 
oceans could not absorb anthropogenic 
emissions of CO2 as fast as they were 
being produced. They further noted that 
this would leave the CO, released as a 
result of human activity in the 
atmosphere for centuries and stared: 
"Human beings are now carrying out a 
large-scale geophysical experiment of a 
kind that could not have happened in 
the past nor be reproduced in the 
future". They further argued that "we 
are returning to the atmosphere and 
oceans the concentrated organic carbon 
stored in the sedimentary rocks over 
hundreds of millions of years." 
The first sophisticated 
atmospheric modelling studies aimed at 
investigating the climatic consequences 
of increasing atmospheric CO2 were 
conducted at the NOAA Geophysical 
Fluid Dynamicc Laboratory, now in 
Princeton, New Jersey. Imbedded 
within the abstract of a paper wrirren by 
Manabe and Weatherald (1967) was the 
conclusion "According to our estimate. 
a doubling of the CO2 content in the 
atmosphere has the effect of raising the 
tempcrature of the atmosphere (whose 
relative humidity is futed) by about 
2°C." This early work yielded a 
projection consistent with the 1996 
United Nations IPCC 'best 
estimate of 2'C warming by 2100 
(where atmospheric CO, is projected to 
double, relative to prcindustrial levels, 
by year 2070). 
By the carly 1980s, the issue of 
climate change began to move from the 
scientific to policy agendas. Several 
scientific assessments of the relationship 
between CO2 and dimate began to 
appear (e.g. NRC, 1979, 1983). On the 
international scene, it is apparent that a 
series of conferences and reports 
organized by the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP), 
International Council of Scientific 
Unions (ICSU), and the World 
Meteorological Organization (&'MO), 
were especially influential. The Second 
Joint UNEPlICSUiWMO International 
Asxssmenr of the role of Carbon 
Dioxide and other Greenhouse Gases in 
Climate Variations and Associated 
Impact, which took place in October 
1985 in Villach, Austria, was 
particularly important in this regard. 
In summary, the theory of global 
warming is based on elementary 
principles of physics - principles that 
were discovered more than a century 
ago: warm climates can't be maintained 
unless there is an excess of greenhouse 
gases to block outgoing radiation; cold 
climates can't be maintained unless 
there is a depletion of greenhouse gases 
(see Fig. 2). If one perturbs these gases, 
one provides a radiative forcing (sec 
next section) to which the E d  system 
must respond. Global warming is not a 
new issue that appeared in 1988 when 
James Hansen gave testimony to the 
U.S. Senate, but rather, it is an issue 
deeply rooted in two centuries of 
science. National and international 
assessments have been conducted on the 
topic since the early 1980s. Most 
recently, this task has been charged to 
the United Nations IPCC. 
W E  lNlERGOVERNMENlM PANEL 
ON CUMN€ CHANGE 
The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change was established in 
1988 by rhe World Meteorological 
Organization and the United Nations 
Environment Programme as a means to 
assess the potenrial problem of global 
4 glaaal cycles d a d  in the Vostok ice core 
P i p  2 Variations in local Antarctic atmospheric temperature, as derived from oxygen 
isotopc data, as weU as concentrations of atmospheric carbon dioxidc and methane From Vostok. 
Antarctica ice core records. The fan that cold dimates aren't mainrainedwithout a depletion of 
greenhouse gases, and that warm dimates aren't maintained without an excess of these 
greenhouse gases is evident. Notice aLo that the current level of atmospheric CO2 (370 ppm) is 
~ 2 0 %  larger than at anyrime during the last 400,000 yun. Similarly, current levels of 
aunosphcric mcthane CH4 (1750 ppb) are morc dw double the maximum value found in 
thc 400,000  yea^ m r d .  Notice also thar the increase in CO2 from 280 ppm to 370 ppm over 
the last 150 years, primarily due to fossil fuel burning, is about thc same as the incmase from 
the depths of the last ice age (21,000 years ago) to 1750 (190 ppm to 280 ppm) (from Petit et 
al., 1999). 
climate change. It is a United Nations 
organization governed by United 
Nations regulations, with a mandate, 
most recently rcaffinned in Vienna in 
October 1998: "The role of the IPCC 
is to assess on a comprehensive, 
objective, open and transparent basis 
the scientific, technical and socio- 
economic information relevant to 
understanding the scientific basis of risk 
of human-induced climate change, its 
potential impam and options for 
adaptation and mitigation. IPCC 
reports should be neutral with respect to 
policy, although they may need to deal 
objectively with scientific, technical and 
socio-economic factors relevant to the 
application of particular policies" (h& 
hlaboutlorinc.Ddf). 
To address this mandate, the 
IPCC oversees three Working Groups 
(WGI, WGII, WGIII) aimed at 
assessing the science, socio-economic 
impacts and adaptation, and mitigation 
aspects of dimate. In thc Thud 
Assessment Report, the mandates of 
these working groups wcre: 
WGI: assesses the scientific aspects of 
the climate system and climate change. 
WGII: addresses the vulnerability of 
socio-economic and natural systems to 
climate change, negative and positive 
consquences of climate change, and 
options for adapting to it. 
WGIII: asscsses options for limit~ng 
greenhouse gas emissions and otherwise 
mitigating climate change. 
A common public 
misconception is that the IPCC 
working groups undertake their own 
independent resewch. This is not the 
cue  - they provide an assessment of 
the pecr-reviewed literamre, although 
they make reference to published 
tcchnial reports. IPCC d w  not 
consider web sites or nmpaper  
opinion pieces and edimrialc to have 
pvsad the standards set by thc peer- 
review system, and so will not include 
these in their assessments. 
T h e  have now been thra 
formal IPCC Assessments of Climate 
Change. The first, in 1990, led m the 
setting up of the Intugovernmend 
Negotiating Cornmittcc for a UN 
Framework Convention on Climate 
Change by the UN General Assembly. 
The second assessment, in 1996, was 
formally used in the negotiations leading 
up to the adoption of the Kyoto 
Protocol to the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Changc at the 
Third Confcrcncc of Pvtics in 1997. 
The Kyoto Protocol requires Canadian 
greenhouse gas emissions to be 6% 
below 1990 levels in the period 
spanning 2008-2012. The third lPCC 
assessment was completed in 2001 and 
the process has now begun to set the 
stagc for the fourth IPCC Assessment 
Report. 
Whiie the assessments provided 
by the IPCC ultimately entcr the 
political arena, as noted above, the 
actual writing of the main body of the 
assessment is free from poEitical 
interference, although governments may 
make suggestions as to potential 
authors. In the third assessment, for 
example, 120 of the world's leading 
climate scientists wrote the WGI 
documcnt, with contributions from over 
500 0th- climate scientists. The 
content of each chapter was chosen 
exdusively by the Lead Authors of that 
chapter, in consultation with the Lead 
Authors of other chapters (to ensure 
there was no duplication). The final 
report underwent review thee times by 
more than 300 experts in the field. This 
review process included an informal 
review by all  Lead Authors, a review by 
apens in the field, an additional arpcrt 
review and a government review. The 
3" drafi of the document was put 
together after the IPCC mming in 
Victoria, British Columbia (July 2426 ,  
2000) and was sent to United Nations 
member states for approval in Shanghai 
in Ianuary 2001. Final changes were 
made to the Summary for Policy 
Makers in Shanghai as a consequence 
of feedback from UN member states. It 
is at this final UN approval phase of the 
Summary for Policy Makers that 
political interference and vested 
interests can become a problem (see for 
example Climate Change Detection and 
Attribution on p. 105). 
As noted above, the formal 
charge of WGI is the assessment of 
available research on the science of 
climate changc, and its association with 
human activities. More specifically: "In 
performing its assessments WGI is 
concerned with: developments in the 
scientific undemanding of past and 
present climate, of climate variability, of 
climatc predictability and of dimate 
change including fecdbacks from 
climate impacts; progress in the 
modelling and projection of global and 
regional climate and sea level change; 
observations of climate, including past 
climates, and assessment of trends and 
anomalies; gaps and uncertainties in 
currcnt knowledge" (htqz;llmnv.meto. 
ICR di . gov.uklsec5 vliocclwell). 
What follows dram heavily from 
the assessment that arose from this 
IPCC WGI process. In particular, some 
of the key findings of Chapter 2 
(Obrmd  climate variability and change) 
are-focussed on in the next section, and 
some of the most important aspects of 
Chapter 9 (Projections offuturr climate 
change) and Chapter 12 (Dcrem'on of 
climate change and amibution of caurrr) 
are highlighted. 
OBSERV1111ONAL MDENCE OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
Radiatlve Forcing of Cllmata 
T h e  Earth is said to be in a global 
radiative equilibrium if the total amount 
of energy received from the sun quals 
the total amount of energy emitted by 
the earth to space. A changc in the 
average net (incoming minus outgoing) 
radiation at the top of the atmosphere is 
defined as a ridiati1~$m'ng. Under this 
terminology, a positive radiative forcing 
a m  to warm the earth's surface, while a 
negative radiative forcing acts to cool it. 
That is, a radiative forcing perturbs thc 
balance between incoming and outgoing 
radiation and over time, the climate 
system (Fig. 3) responds to try and 
reestablish global radiative equilibrium. 
Carbon dioxide (Cod ,  Methane 
(CH4), and Nitrous Oxide (N,O) are 
examples of greenhouse gases whose 
increase over the last 150 years has 
provided a positive radiative forcing 
(Fig. 4). Aerosols, which are tiny liquid 
or solid particles in the atmosphere, are 
most often considered to provide a 
negative radiative forcing (e.g. sulphate 
aerosols released in the combustion of 
coal, for aample). These, and other 
aerosols, affect the radiation balance of 
the F,arth by both directly scattering 
Figure 3 Schematic representation of the climate system (from IPCC, 2001), 
incoming radiation back to space and 
indirmly affecting the formation, 
lifctimc and properties of clouds. 
Of course, there are significant 
differences in the atmospheric residence 
time of individual greenhouse gases and 
aerosols as a result of natural removal 
mechanisms. Tropospheric aerosols, for 
example, stay in thc atmosphere only a 
few d a p  as they are effectively 
scavenged by precipitation. 
Stratospheric aerosols, such as those 
released during volcanic eruptions, have 
a residence time of up to a f m  years 
since they must fim dsccnd, through 
gravig, into the troposphere before they 
can be scavenged by precipitation. Thc 
average carbon dioxide molecule has a 
residence time in the atmosphere of 
between 50 and 200 years, methane 
about 12 years, nitrous oxide about 120 
years, CFC-l1 about 50 years, and a 
pcrfluorocarbon (another greenhouse 
gas) about 50,000 years. 
Finally, it is important to note 
that the F,arth system does not instantly 
reach radiative equilibrium once a 
radiative forcing is applied. The slow 
time scales inherent in the system, such 
as those associated with the ocean, lead 
to a lag of several cenmrics before 
quasi-equilibrium can be reached. As a 
specific example, Wigley (1998) 
considered the climatic effects of the 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. He 
showed that if all countries followed 
their baseline changes after 2010 (i.e., 
all countries met their Kyoto targets but 
did no more for the test of this 
century), the resulting 'best guess' 
warming of 2.08"C (relative to 2000) by 
2100 would only be reduced to 2.O0C. 
Similarly, the 'best guess' sea level rise 
of about 50 cm (relative to 2000) would 
only reduce to 48.5 cm. In fact, if 
Kyoto targets were met by all and a 
further l%lyear reduction in emissions 
occurred after 2010, the warming at 
2100 would only drop to 1.80"C and 
sea level rise to 45.5 cm. 
Unlike the case for glacial to 
interglacial changes which occurred on 
the timescales of millennia (Fig. 2), 
thereby allowing the Earth System time 
to cquilibrate with changes in the 
radiative forcing, the current rate of 
change in radiative forcing is vcry 
rapid. As such, there is inevitable 
HlQh W l m  W l u m  Low Very m Vary Vary Very Vary Vary 
Low Low Low Low L W L o w L o w  LOW 
Level of SdenURc Understanding 
Figure 4 Global and annual-mean radiative forcing (WIm2) for various agcnts from prc 
industrial (1750) to the present (late 1990s). The height of the rectangular bar denotes a best 
estimate value, while its absence denotes no best estimate is possible. The v c ~ d  line about the 
rectangular bar with "X" delirmters indicates an estimate of the uncertainty range, for the most 
pan guided by the spread in the published values of the forcing. A venial line without a 
rectangular bar and with "0" ddimiters denotes a forcing for which no central estimate can be 
given owing to large uncerrainties. A "level of scientific understanding" index is accorded to 
&ch forcing, wid;higb, medium, low and very low levels, tcsprniveli. This rcprescntr the 
subjective judgment about the diability of the forcingestimatc. The mu-mixcd grccnhoux 
gases are grouped together into a single rectangular bar. The sign of the effects due to mined 
dust is itsclfan uncertainty and the indirect forcing due to tropospheric aerosols as well as the 
forcing due to aviation via their cffccts on contrails and cirrus clouds is poorly understood. The 
forcing associated with snatospheric aerosols from volcanic eruptions is highly variable over the 
period and is not considered for this plot. It is emphasized that the positive and negative global- 
mean forcings cannot be added up and viewed a priori as providing offsets in terms of the 
complctc global d i a t c  impact (from IPCC, 2001). 
everywhere by about the same amount. 
This is not the case and there are, in 
fict, regions where the unh has -led 
ovcr the 20h cennuy (Fig. 64. 
Warming on the global sale  is either 
amplified or reduced thmugb local 
fecdbacks. In general, the warming is 
much lvgn over land wmparcd to 
oceans (sec for eumple Fig. 5 and 6d) 
as the ocuns have a higher heat 
capacity, and can sequester heat to great 
depths. Warming is also genedy  larger 
at high latitudes dun at low latimda, 
because of the existence of a powerful 
positive feedback involving the albedo 
of snow and ice (the albedo of a surfacc 
is defined as the percentage of incoming 
solar radiation hitting the surfau: that is 
reflmed back to space). That is, as 
snow and ice covcr retreat, as has been 
observed over the 20h century, 
especially since 1979, the land surface 
darkens and so d o a  not reflect as much 
rad~ation back m space. In the cue of 
sea ice, the observed reduction in areal 
extent also exposes more of the ocean to 
the atmosphere, thereby allowing the 
wanning of the atmosphere through 
heat loss from the ocean. 
Annual Global Surfaw Mmn 
Ternpentun Anomallr 
wanning in srore as the eanh system 
attempts to equilibrate with the higher 
levels of greenhouse gases. In t e r n  of 
climate change therefore, the real 
policy question that needs to be 
addressed is: what do we as a society 
consider to be an acceptable level of 
future warming? 
Okewed Changss in Surface Air 
-"v 
Several researchers around the world 
have independently put together global 
data sets of surface air temperatures 
from the instrumental record. AU of 
these researchers have either used only 
non-urban locations or wrrccted the 
urban data for what is known as the 
urban h a t  island effect, whereby cities 
naturally warm as they grow. 
The globally avenged surfice air 
temperature has increased by about 0.6 
i 0.2"C over the 20h century. Most of 
this warming has occurred during two 
periods: 191&1945 and 1976-2000 
(Fig. 5, 6). Very recently, proxy data 
from, for example, boreholes, corals 
and tree rings have allowed for the 
rewnstruction of northern hemisphere 
temperatures back as far as AD 1000. 
Several such reconstructions are shown 
in Figure 7 (bottom). Of particular 
imporrancc is that rcwnstrucced and 
instrumental records generally agree 
over their common period. In the last 
1,000 years the 20h century is the 
warmest century, the 1990s the warmest 
decade. Furthermore, the top 10 
warmest years since 1880 in descending 
order are: 1998; 2002; 2001; 1997; 
1995; 1990; 1999: 2000; 1991; 1987 
(Fig. 5). 
A common misconception is 
that global warming implies warming 
Fie 5 (top) Annual mean global surface 
air temperature anomalies (from the US 
NOAA) over: land + wean (top panel); 
ocean only (middle panel); land only 
(bottom panel). 
The warming is also amplified in 
the winter, and m a lesser mat spring, 
over land (Fig. 8) since the snow albedo 
e&aisLrgatatthistimeofyeu.In 
addiaon, the warming acnd over land 
since 1950, on average, has been about 
twice as fut at night compared to the 
day (Fig. 9). That is, night-time low 
temperatures have increased twice as 
fast as day-timc high temperatures 
(O.Z°C pu decade venus 0.1"C per 
decade). It is currently thought that this 
decrease in diurnal tempenture range is 
associated with the obscrved increase in 
cloud coverage since 1950. This follows 
since clouds act to dampen diurnal 
temperature variations by back 
reflecting incoming solar radiation in 
the day and absorbing and re-radiating 
outgoing longwave radiation from the 
earth at night. Similarly, the direct 
e&ct of tropospheric aerosols only acts 
in the day (when there is incoming solar 
radiation to backscaner) while 
greenhouse gases are effective both day 
and night. As with the warming trends, 
there are some regions where in hct the 
diurnal temperature range has increased 
since 1950, although most regions show 
a reduction. 
It is not possible to provide an 
exhaustive discussion of all the observed 
changes in dimate since the start of the 
20b century so the reader is referred to 
Figure 10. This figure captures the 
essence of most of the major 20h 
century observed changes. It is 
important to note that the observed 
changes are internally consistent with 
each other, as well as with physical 
intuition, without needing to appal to 
complicated coupled atmosphere-ocean 
models. Increasing greenhouse gases 
a positive radiative forcing that 
warms the surface of the Eanh and 
melts glaciers, snow and sea ice. 
Change is much smaller over the 
oceans, and hence around Antarctica 
relative to the Arctic, because of the 
high heat capacity of the ocean. A 
warmer atmosphere holds more 
moisture so that cloud coverage should 
be expected to increase, leading to a 
reduction in the diurnal temperature 
range. The hydrological cyde should 
also intensify leading to enhanced 
Figure 6 Annual m a n  tunpuafure trends ("Cldecade) for the periods a) 1901-1999; 
b) 1910-1945; c) 1961975;  d) 1976-1999. The magnitude of the acnd is given by the 
atca of the cirde and the sign of the trcnd is paritive (wuming) ifthc circle is red, and ncgadvc 
(mlingl ifthc cirde is blue (hom Chapter 2 of IPCC, 2001). 
. . ~  
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Fie 7 Nonhern hemisphere surface air temperature reconstructions since AD 1000: (pink) 
summer, northern hemisphere, multi-proxy-based (Joneset al., 1998); (black) annual mean, 
northcm hemisphere, multi-proxy-based (Manner al., 1999); (green) summer, cnrampid,  
tree-ring-based ( B r a ,  2000); (blue) annual mean, 30"N-70"N averaged, multi-proxy-based 
( M m  et d., 1999); (orange) annual mean, northern hemisphere, instrumental record. As 
noted in IPCC (2001), all curves were smoothed with a 40-year Hamming-weights lowpm 
filter, with boundary constrainrs imposed by padding the series with its mean values during the 
first and last 25 yurs. Two standard error limits arc shown by gray shading. The horizontal zero 
black line denotes the 1961-1990 reference mean tempcnrure (from Chaptet 2 of 
IPCC, 2001). 
Figure 8 Seasonal mean temperature trends ("Cldecade) for the period 1976-1999. 
a) Winter: December, Januw, Febmur, b) Spring: Much, April, May: c) Summer: June, July, . - 
August; d) Autumn ~e~ tekbe r ,  0ct&~r, November. The magnitude of the trend is gi&n 
by the area of the circle and the sign of rhc trend is positive (warming) if thc circle is red and 
ncgativc (cooling) if thc circle L bluc (from Chapter 2 of IPCC, 2001). 
numerid weather prediction around 
the world, coupled to interactive ocean 
and sea ice models. All GCMs include a 
land suface scheme and some now 
allow predictions of how terrestrial 
vegetation will respond to a changing 
dimate. CIimav mod& arc not used to 
predict weather, hut rarhcr the slow 
m a n  change of average weather and its 
statistics. They are built on the physical 
principles drat we believe govern the 
various components of the dimate 
system. Before a dimate model is 
deemed useful for future d i r e  
projections, it must be satisfactorily 
tested against the present-day and 
transient 20b century climate. GCM 
simulations of past climates (e.g. 6,000 
and 21.000 years ago) are also 
compared with paleo-reconst~ctions to 
evaluate the model's performance. 
Model deficiencies found through this 
evaluation process are documented, and 
attempts are then made ro reduce or 
eliminate them. 
P i  9 Trend in annual mean diurnal temperature range ("Cldecade). The magnitude of 
the trend is given by the area of the circle and the sign of the trend is positive (warming) if the 
circle is red and negative (choliig) if the circlc is bluc. Data are from thc period 195&1993 
and from non-urban stations only (from Chapter 2 of IPCC, 2001). 
precipitarion at mid- to high-latitudes, ocsurred, and also what these same 
with more extreme precipitation events, models project will occur more 
along with enhanced evaporation at low noticeably in the fume. 
latitudes. 
Figure 10 is particularly uscful PROJECTIONS OF QlMATE CHANGE 
for comparison with a similar figure Wren APPuCrmONSTO CANAM 
that w i U  be reproduced in the next 
section (Fig. 17). This latter figure will 
summarize what a variety of coupled 
atmosphere-ocean general circulation 
models (GCMs) project for a fume 
climate warmed through increasing 
greenhouse gases. It will be evident that 
what has already occurred is consistent 
with what models suggest should have 
Coupled atmosphere-ocean General 
Circulation Models (GCMs) have 
evolved considerably over the years and 
are continually Lxiig improved, both in 
terms of resolution and through the 
inclusion of new, sophisticated, physical 
parametrisarions. They consist of an 
atmospheric component, developed 
through decades of r w r c h  in 
S c a ~ r l o s  of Fvtum Emissions 
Any projection of future climate change 
fundamentally requires assumptions to 
be made as to what future emissions of 
greenhouse gases and aerosols will be. 
These in turn are determined by 
making assumptions on future 
economic and population growth, 
technological change, energy use, etc. 
Clearly it is difficult if not impossible to 
make accurate projections of these 
socioeconomic factors over 100 years. 
As such, the IPCC put forth a number 
of scenarios of future emissions undcr a 
wide range of possible 'stoty lines' of 
socioeconomic and technological 
change in the furure. In its second 
scientific assessment, six such scenarios 
were developed (IS92a-0. In the third 
lPCC assessment, 40 different 
scenarios were put forward (see IPCC, 
2000). 
Several of the possible scenarios 
lead to projected reductions of 
greenhouse gas emissions over the 2111 
century (see for example the green curve 
in Fig. 11). Several other scenarios lead 
to continued growth in emissions, and 
others suggest that emissions continne 
to increase in the shorn term but 
eventually start to decrease. Si sample 
profiles are shown in Figure 11 together 
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(a) Temperature in " m 
OCEAn 
with the IS92a or 'h guess' pm& 
uxd in the second sciendfic 7 wssment. None of the individual 
scenarios can be termed 'correct', sin= 
each is as equally plausible or 
implausible as the other. In order m 
produce a range of possible dimate 
outcomes, it is therefote advisable to 
integrate coupled models under as many 
of the scenvios as possible. 
It has, however, not yet been 
possible for wmprehmive GCMs to 
run century-long integrations using all 
scenarios solely due m the lack of 
available computing time. Nevertheless, 
several groups around the world have 
run their GCMs under a select number 
of thcsc scenarios. The dimate 
sensitivity of a p i c u l v  GCM is 
d&ed as the equilibrium wvming for 
a doubling of atmospheric CO2 
Togcrher with the oceanic h u t  uptake 
obtained &om these same GCMs, the 
GCM dimate sensitivities can be uxd 
in simpler models to span the full m g e  
of sccnvios to get estimates of first- 
order quantities like global sea-level rise 
and surface air temperature changes 
over the next century. These simple 
models, however, do not allow one to 
make projections of regional changes in 
climate. 
Ib) Hvdroloalcal and storm --I-*-' '-"----- 
&np from ample M& 
Figure 12, derived from a simple 
climate model that uses dimate 
sensitivity and oceanic heat uptake from 
more complex climate models, provides 
an initial illustration of the projected 
global mean surface temperature change 
over the 2151 century. Using the range of 
climate sensitivities from coupled 
GCMs and all emissions scenarios, one 
arrives at a range of projected 2100 
warming, relative to 1990, of 1.4- 
5.8"C. This range, reported in the 
IPCC Third Assessment Report (IPCC, 
2001), is higher than the 1.0-3.5"C 
range repoLed in the Second 
Assessment Report (IPCC, 1996) 
simply because a greater range of 
scenarios are now being used, and not 
Figure 10 Schematic diagram of observed variations in a) tempcramre; b) hydrological and 
storm-related indicators (from theTechnid Summary of IPCC, 2001). 
- 
because of any increase in model 
uncertainty. That is, in the 1996 report, 
only six scenarios were used, whereas 
now 40 scenarios arc used. Generally, 
the newer scenarios yield lower sulphur 
l inn 
dioxide emissions (bottom panel of 
Fig. 11) and hence less cooling fiom the 
resulting direct and indirect effects of 
the aerosols. 
The international media picked 
up on the differences between the range 
of IPCC 1996 and 2001 projections. In 
articles that appeared in the United 
Kingdom's Daily Telegraph (Pacc of 
global warming 'could doubli, by Charles 
Clover, January 25, 2001) as well as the 
National Post (Hot, hot i tbr range, by 
Margaret Munro, January 23, 2001), it 
was stated: "Global warming could 
happen twice as quickly as previously 
forecast over the next 100 years, the 
most authoritative report yet produced 
on the science of dimate change said". 
There were other similar articles 
that appeared in international, national 
and local newspapers that left the public 
with the distinct impression that 
scientists had now determined that the 
pace of global warming would double. 
O n  the other hand, an article in the 
Toronto Star (%p scicnrisa call UN. 
rqort on cfirnate change miskading, by 
Peter Caamai, January 23, 2001) 
quoted me correctly as saying: "Based 
on the science you can't say it is going 
to warm faster." The quote was correct, 
and the content of the article was also 
accurate, but its headline left the 
impression that as one of the Lead 
Authors in IPCC (2001), I was in 
apparent disagreement with the findings 
of the Third Assessment Report. In fact, 
the Toronto Star reporter conveyed to 
me in an email: "Of course, I disavow 
any responsibility for the headlinen. 
Ironically, the headline led to my 
ceremoniously being added to several 
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Figure 12 Simple model projected global and annual mean temperature change relative to 
1990 under a wide range of scenarios. The dark shading gives the range using all scenarios and 
the average model climate sensitivity. The light shading extends this range by calculating the 
spread for each GCM climate sensitivity independently. Note that in all cases, warming is 
- - _ _  projected even though in Bl, emissions of COz and CH4 are assumed to drop substantially 
do0  A20 &o 2d60 2deo 2100 below 1990 levels (Fig. 11) (from the Summary for Policy Makers of IPCC, 2001). 
Year 
Figure 11 Projected anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide (COJ, methane (CHd, nitrous oxide (N20) and sulphur dioxide (SOJ for six 
illustrative scenarios. The six scenarios differ in their assumptions of future population growth, technology paths, economic growth, etc. (see 
IPCC, 2000). For example, AlFl represents a world characterized by rapid economic growth although global population peaks in the middle of 
this century and drops after that. A fossil-fuel intensive path of technological change is assumed as is a reduction in regional differences in per 
capita income (IPCC, 2000) (from the Technical Summary of IPCC, 2001). 
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climate change skcptic sites and my 
being re-quoted in xvctal anti-Kyoto 
articles internationally. I added this 
example to highlight the confusion that 
often arises in the media whcn the 
climate change science is reported. 
With regards to the IPCC 
(2001) increased projection of 2100 
warming of 1.45.8"C, rclative to the 
1.0-3.5"C range reported in (IPCC, 
1996), 1 attended a presentation by an 
analyst involved in negotiating Kyoto 
commitments. Thc speaker confidently 
stated that the grcatcr range arose 
because the dimate modcls had become 
more uncertain. The reality, of course, 
is that in the 2001 IPCC report, a 
wider range of scenarios was used in 
order to capturc a mote diverse range 
of possible socio-economic 
assumptions, leading to a more diverse 
range of future emissions. Global 
warming was not suddenly expected to 
double (a confusion which arose 
because the upper bound was raised 
from 3.5 to 5.8"C); climate models had 
not become morc uncertain (a 
confusion which arose because the 
spread between maximum and 
minimum projected warming had 
increased from 2.5 to 4.4'C). Very 
simply, for a more diverse range of 
emission scenarios, the climate models 
projected a mote diverse range of 
possible future climates. 
Uncertainty in CIInuta Change 
Rolcctrons 
There are two types of uncertainties 
involved in climate change projections 
(NRC, in press): those that ate 
essentially random (aleatoric 
uncertainty); and those which arise 
from an incomplete understanding of a 
particular process (epistcmic 
uncertainty). By its very definition, the 
aleatoric uncertainty is impossible to 
reduce (i.e., the odds of getting 'heads' 
when flipping a coin once is never more 
or less than 50%). In the climate 
contcxr, the estimation of aleatoric 
uncertainty is often accomplished by 
using one model to create an ensemble 
of climate model integrations. The 
range spanned by the different 
integrations, which differ only in their 
initial condition, then represents an 
estimate of uncertainty associated with 
random procesxs and n a d  climate 
variability. The mean of the ensemble 
represents a best estimate. 
An estimation of epistemic 
uncertainty can be obtained by using 
differcnt models with different 
paramctrisations of unresolved 
processcs and integrating each of these 
with the same tadiative forcing. As 
such, the intermodd variation gives an 
estimate of model uncertainty and the 
intramodel variation gives an estimate 
of uncertainty associatcd with natural 
variability. 
Thc cpistemic uncertainty in 
climate changc projections can further 
be broken down into two components: 
onc involving uncertainty in climate 
feedbacks, and one involving 
uncertainty in the emissions scenario 
wed to drive the dimate model. In 
terms of o v c d  uncenainry, each 
contributes about 50%, the latter being 
dependent on poorly constrained 
assumptions of future population 
growth, social behaviour, economic 
growth, energy use and technology 
change. Compounding the problem of 
uncertainty is the potential existence of 
'unknown unknowns' whose importance 
only becomes apparent once they arc 
discovered. 
Nevertheless, extensive research 
has bccn conducted over the last several 
years in an attempt to quantify 
uncertainty in climate change 
projections. Stott and Ketdeborough 
(2002) found that in the absence of 
policies to mitigate climate change, 
climate changc projections over the next 
40 years are insensitive to the particular 
emission scenario used (see also Zwiers, 
2002). Knutti et al. (2002) further found 
that thcre is a 40% chance that actual 
warming at 2100 will exceed the upper 
bound of the range (1.4-5.8"C) 
estimated in the lPCC Third 
Assessment Report. They found only a 
5% chance that it will be less than the 
lower bound. 
While science is likely to reduce 
the epistemic uncertainty of the known 
unknowns over the next decade, it is 
also likely to discover new unknowns. 
In terms of projections of climate 
change over the next 40 years, it is 
unlikely that science will change the 
global estimate and range of warming. 
N~errheless, where scicnce is likely to 
make substantial reduction in 
uncertainty is with regards to the 
development of better schemes for 
regional downscaling of climate 
projcctions. This will allow for the 
dcvclopment of Id adaptation 
strategies while the necessary 
international negotiations to movc 
towards significantly reduced global 
emissions takes place. 
- ~~ 
As noted earlier, the enormous 
computational requirements needed to 
integrate coupled atmosphcrc-occan 
general circulation models under the full 
40 scenarios of fututc emissions meant 
that only a few illustrative scenarios 
could be examined for thc third IPCC 
wcssment. Figure 13  shows the multi- 
model enscmble mean projected 
warming averaged over 2071-2100 
relative to 1961-1990 for the A2 and 
B2 scenarios, whose emissions are 
shown in Figure 11. To obtain a multi- 
model ensemble mean, the first step is 
to collect an ensemble of integrations 
obtained from one GCM under a 
particular scenario but with slightly 
different initial conditions. The sccond 
step is to avcrage the results of this 
model ensemble with analogous 
ensembles obtaincd from several 
different GCMs. 
While it is not meaningful to 
pick a particular place on the Earth's 
surface and say unequivocally that it will 
warm by a certain amount over the next 
century, a number of key conclusions 
can be drawn. First, land areas warm 
more than ocean areas because of the 
greater heat capacity of the ocean. 
Second, the interior of the continents 
warm more than the coasts as they are 
farther away from the ocean. Third, the 
west coast at northern midlatitudes 
tends to warm less than the east coast as 
the former is more influenced by the 
ocean since the prevailing winds are 
from west to east. Fourth, the high 
latitudes warm more than the lower 
latitudes as a result of powerful albedo 
feedbacks associated with retreating 
snow and sea ice. As noted earlier, an 
additional positive feedback arising 
O[T I ILMEMNTs  ANDTHE 
W S S I B I U l Y  OF SURPRISES 
Figurr 13 The annual mean temperature change (coloured shading) and intermodel range 
(contour lines) between the year 2071-2100 and 1961-1990 average climates. Coupled 
atmosphere-ocean GCMs were driven by either Scenario A2 (top); or scenario B2 (bottom). All 
units are in "C (from theTechnid Summary of IPCC, 2001). 
from retreating sea ice is that the ocean 
is no longer insulated from the 
atmosphere and so can warm it from 
below. Fifrh, the northern hemisphere 
warms more than the southern 
hemisphere as there is more land there. 
Enhanced warming is also 
projected in the winter months relative 
to the summer months as indicated in 
Figure 14 for the Canadian Centre for 
Climate Modelling and Analysis model 
integrated under the IS92a scenario. 
This particular simulation also reveals 
local cooling around the North Atlantic 
due to a weakening of the North 
Atlantic conveyor and subsequent 
reduction in northward ocean heat 
transport there. Figure 14 also shows 
other regions of little warming, or even 
slight cooling, around India and 
southeast Asia due to concentrated 
industrial activity and the local cooling 
effects associated with anthropogenic 
tropospheric aerosols. 
-Events 
Extreme weather cvents are important 
from a policy perspective as they cause 
the most stress on adaptation strategies 
for dimate change. Adaptation 
strategies aimed exclusively at dealing 
with a slow mean change in d i a t e  
could be ineffective if they do not also 
account for projected changes in 
climate and weather statistics associated 
with the projected mean climate 
change. In its Third Assessment Report, 
the IPCC (IPCC 2001) undertook a 
systematic analysis of observed changes 
in extreme weather and dimate events 
over the 20" century and their 
projected change over the 2111 century 
(summarized in Table 1, reproduced 
from IPCC, 2001, below). 
Abrupt Climate Change 
Rapid transitions between fundament- 
ally different climate regimes have 
commonly occurred over the last 
400,000 years (Fig. 2; see Clark et al., 
2002 for a review). On the other hand, 
the last 10,000 years (the Holocene) has 
had a remarkably stable climate, leading 
to the rise of agriculture and modern 
society. The potential disruptive impact 
of an abrupt climate change event has 
led scientists to try and grapple with its 
possible likelihood of future occurrence. 
Two specific climate change surprises 
have been given special attention. The 
first involves trying to determine the 
probability of a collapse of the West 
Antarctic Ice sheet - an event that 
would lead to a 6 m global sea level rise 
over a relatively short ~e r iod  of time. 
The second involves assessing the 
likelihood of a complete shutdown of 
the North Atlantic conveyor - if this 
were to occur, the global oceanic deep 
circulation would be reorganized and 
the amount of heat transported 
northward in the North Atlantic by the 
ocean would be substantially reduced; 
this would tend to affect the climate 
over land downwind of the ocean (i.e., 
Europe). In its Third Assessment 
Report, the IPCC (IPCC 2001) 
concluded that the former was very 
unlikely (1-10% chance) to occur over 
the 2151 century and noted that it was 
too early to determine whether an 
CCCma Global Coupled Climate Model - CGCMZ 
projected change in surface alr temperature 
(2041-2060) - (1971-1990) DJF MEAN ST CHANGE (C) 
DJF 
the conveyor to presentday lcvds m 
that during this d b a t  p k  
the ocean Conveyor would act 
positive fdback to warming in and 
around the Nonh AtLnrk. Whax is 
I wen less known, and d an 
outsrvlding question, is how the 
srabiity of the conveyor will change in a 
Fuwe d i a t e  warmed through 
anthropogcnic greenhouse gases. 
PmJwted Qill.t. Ck.nga and 
c.o.d. 
Chapter 10 of the IPCC Third 
Assessment was charged with assessing 
Rceional Climate Information both in 
re& of the evaluation of regional 
climates and the projection of regional 
dimate change. This chapter formally 
s h o d  that the warming found in 
(2041-2060) - (1971-l9W) JJA MEAN ST CHANGE (C) w e d  coupled atmosphere-ocean GCMs driven by WO illustrative 
scenarios (A2 and B2; sec Fig. 11 and 
13), was 40% above the global average 
in the winter months at high northern 
la t i~des  (sec Fig. 15). The ENA, CNA 
and WNA regions, which indudc most 
of southern Canada, showed g r u t a  
than average warming, in both summa I and winter, for both the A2 and B2 
scenarios. The GRL region, which 
indudes some of northern GNdz is 
projected to have greater than average 
warming in the summer and much 
greater than average warming in the I winter months. As such, the 1.45.8"C 
I globally-averaged warming projections 
bv 2100 should be considered to bc 
Figure 14 The mean temperam change bcrwecn the avenge seasonal dimate in 2041- 
2060 and 1971-1990 under an IS92 scenario. Top) Winter - December, January, Fcbruuy; 
Bonom) Summer - June, July, August. AU units are in "C. This figure was obtained from 
Dr. G. Flato of the Canadian Centre for Climate Modelling and Analysis in Victorii, British 
Columbia. 
irreversible change in the conveyor is 
likely or not over this same period. 
Most, but not all, coupled model 
projections of the 21st century climate 
show a reduction in the strength of the 
conveyor in the No& Adantic with 
increasing concentrations of greenhouse 
gases (IPCC, 2001). Nevertheless, all 
coupled modd simulations show that 
Europe continues to warm even in those 
sirnulations where the conveyor shuts 
down. In those sirnulations where the 
conveyor reduces in the short term, the 
ocean acts as a negative feedback to 
high-latitude warming. A reducing 
conveyor reduces high-latitude ocean 
heat transport and hence sea surface 
temperatures. This affects atmospheric 
surface temperatures both directly and 
indirectly, through feedhacks on ice 
areal extent. Over the longer term, most 
climate models find a reestablishment of 
k p I i i e d  over most of Canada (see 
Fig. 13 and 14). 
Similarly, there is intermodel 
agreement that the GRL and ALA 
regions, which include much of 
northern Canada and all  of the 
Canadian Arctic, will receive at least a 
5-20% increase in precipitation in 
summa and winter by the years 2071- 
2100 (Fig. 16). Under the A2 scenario 
(Fig. l l and 13) greater than 20% 
increases are projected for these 
regions. Both the WNA and ENA 
regions are projected to have increases 
of 5-20% in precipiration by 2071- 
2100 in the winter, although in the 
summary as well as in the CAN region, 
intermodel differences are of 
inconsistent sign. 
T& 1 Estimates of confidence in observed and projected changes in extreme weather and dimate events. V i d y  certain (>99% chance 
that a result is mc); Very Likely (90-99% chance); Likely (66-9096 chance); Medium Likelihood (3366% chance); Unlikely (10.33% 
chance); Very Unlikely (]-ID% chance); hp t iona l l y  Unlikely (<l% chance)(from IPCC, 2001). 
Confidence in obKncd chnog+l Chnngea in Phcnomcnon Confidence in projected changes 
(latter hplf of the 2 M  ccnnuy) (during h e  21K ccnny)  
W Higher maximum tempcures and morc Very Likely 
hot days over nearly all land areas 
Very Likely Higher minimum tempetanua, &er cold Very Likely 
days and frost days over nearly all land arcas 
Vcry Likely R e d u d  diurnal tempencurc range over most Vcry Likely 
land areas 
Likely, over many areas Increase of heat index (a measure of human Very Likely, over most arcas 
discomfort) over land areas 
Likely, over many northern hemisphere More intense precipitation events Very Likely, wer many areas 
mid- to high latitude land areas 
Likely, in a few a m  Increased summer continental drying and L i l y ,  over most midlarimde continental 
associated riskof droughc interiors (lack ofconsistent projections in 
other areas) 
Not observed in the few analyses available Increasein tropical cydone peak wind inrensities Likely, over some areas 
Insufficient data for assessment Increase in tropical cyclone mean and peak Likely, over some areas 
precipitation intensities 
Mum greater man a v e w  waning 
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Figure 15 Analysis of inter-model consistency in regional relative warming (relative to each 
model's global-average warming). Regions are classified as showing either agreement on 
warming in excess of 40% above the global average ('Much greater than avenge warming'); 
greater than the global average ('Greater than avenge warming'); less than the global average 
('Less than avenge warming'); or disagreement amongst models on the magnitude of regional 
relative warming ('Inconsistent magnimde ofwarmiog'). There is also a category that never 
occurs for agreement on cooling. A consistent result from at least seven of the nine models is 
deemed necessary for agreement. The global annual average warming of the models used span 
1.2 to 4.5"C for A2 and 0.9 to 3.4"C for B2, and therefore a regional 40% amplzcation 
represents warming ranges of 1.7 to 6.3"C for A2 and 1.3 to 4.TC for B2 (from the Technical 
Summary of IPCC, 2001). 
SUMMARY 
As is the case for the previous section, 
there ate simply too many projected 
changes fmm too many coupled 
atmosphere GCMs to provide a 
comprehensive description of all aspects 
of future projected change. Figure 17, 
from the IPCC (20011, summarizes the 
projected changes for the end of the 21st 
cencury with an assigned level of 
confidence (vinually certain: >99% 
probability; very likely: 90-99s 
probability; likely: 66-90% probability; 
medium likelihood: 33-66% 
probability). The comparison of 
Figure 17 with Figure 10 suggests that 
what has already occurred in the climate 
record is consistent with what models 
suggest should have occurred, and also 
what these same models project will 
occur more noticeably in the future. 
There ate certain phenomena 
listed in Figure 10 that are nor listed in 
Figure 17 as they are either not 
resolved, or there is a disagreement 
between models as to what might occur. 
Tornadoes, thunder days, hail, lake and 
river ice melt, for example, are not 
resolved in coarse resolution climate 
F i  16 As in F i  15but for precipitation. Regions are classifid as showing athcr 
agramcnt on in- with an avengc change of grclfct rhan 2096 ('W inuezu'); between 5 
and 20% ('Incrw.~'); between -5 and +5% ('No change'); agmment on dmaw with an 
avuagc change between -5 and -20% ('Dmeue'); las than -20% ( T q c  deuase'); or 
disagreement ('Inconsistent sign'). Incmsm or decreases are for thc 2071-2100 mean relative to 
the 1961-1990 mean. A consistent result fiom at least scvcn of the nine models is deemed 
necasry for a p e m a t  (from theTechniul Summary of IPCC. 2001). 
models so no assessment can yet be despite, as reported in Gelbspan (1997): 
made as to their future changes. "...ddiberate anempts to o b h t e  and 
C l i a t c  models all have doud underminc the documents by the OPEC 
parametrisations that di&r from model nations, principally Saudi Arabii and 
to model and the resulting changes in Kuwait ..." This cautious statement 
amount and type of douds varies reprscnted the consensus v im of those 
between models. scientists working in WGI. It was b a d  
on the results of only a fey detection 
Uinuta Change D.t.ctlon and and attribution studies available at the 
AtMkakn time. Since 1996, there have been many 
The climate system changes on a variety more published works firming up the 
of timescales both through ~ n r r a l ,  sciencc behind this statement. As a 
internal processes as well as in response result, in the third WGI IPCC 
to variations in external forcing (e.g., assessment released in January 2001, a 
solar changes, volcanic emissions, much stronger statement was used: 
greenhouse gases). As such, the 'There is now new and stronger 
detection of dimate change involves evidence that most of the warming 
looking, in a statistically significant observed over the last 50 years is 
sense, for the emergence of a signal attributable to human activities." 
above the background of m r a l  climate In fact, there does not appear to 
variability. Attribution involvcs be any detection and attribution study 
specifically assigning a causc for the that has been able to explain the 
detected signal to human activities, warming in the second half of the 
variations in other external forcing, or a century through any known natural 
combination of both. cause. 
In 1996, the IPCC second As noted earlier, global mean 
scientific assessment included the surface air temperatures have increased 
statement: by 0.6 i 0.2 'C since 1860, althougb 
"The balance of evidence suggests a this warming has not occurred in a 
discernible human iduence on global constant hhion. In fact most of the 
dimate." warming has occurred during two 
distinct periods: trom 1910-1945 and 
since 1976, with a very gradual umling 
during the intervening period. Global 
warming critics have been quick m 
point out that most models which have 
simulated the climate of the 2Odl 
century have failed to capture rhii 
feature. 
Fkerchcrs at the Hadley 
Gntre in the Univd Kingdom, among 
others, have recently reported upon the 
most comprehensive simulations to date 
of the dimate of the 206 century (Ston 
et al., 2000). They found that natural 
forcing agents (solar forcing and 
volcanic emissions), while n e m m y  to 
simulate the early century warming, 
could not account for the warming in 
m n t  decades. Similarly, anthmpogenic 
forcing alone (greenhouse gases and 
sulphate mosoLs) was insufEdeat to , 
explain the 1910-1945 warming but. - ' S  3 
was ncussary to simulate the wvming 
since 1976 (see Fig. 18). Very similar 
mults were also obtained using a 
completely difFcrent and independent 
model (the UVic Evth S p m  model of 
intermediate compluiry - Weaver et 
al., 2001; Matthcws et al., 2003), with 
very different parametrisations and 
representations of the individual 
components of the climate system 
(Fig. 19). 
By regressing the large-scale 
signals from their simulations on 
d e d  mean observations, Stott et d. 
(2000) demonstrated that natural 
forcing alone is not a plausible 
explanation for the observed changcs in 
the 2W ccntury, and that n a r d  and 
anthropogenic forcing both make 
significant contributions to the observed 
change. They showed that when 
combined, these signals explain 
approximately 80% of the observed 
interdecadal variance of global mean 
temperature. 
The experiments performed by 
Stott and colleagues rook into account 
estimated historical variations in the 
main anthropogenic and natural external 
forcing agents that are believed to have 
affected the dimate of the past century. 
These included heat-trapping green- 
house gases and change in ozone 
abundance (also a greenhouse gas), and 
the formation of sulphate aerosols from 
the industrial emission of sulphur 
(a) Temperature indicatofs dioxide. Their approach was far &om a 
l 
diagnostic curve-fitting exercise. Rather, 
a model built on physical principles was 
used to simulate the dimate's response 
to independent estimates of historical 
diolate forcing. The suiking level of 
agreement obtained bawecn observed 
and simulated d e d - S &  temperature 
variations strongly supports the 
contention that radiative forcing from 
NEAR SURFACE anthropogenic activities, moderated by 
"'air temperature warms variations in solar and volcanic forcing, 
has been the main driver of dimate 
during the pu t  century. -W- sea surfs.- .-...,..-. dre 
warms aimosteverywhere 
(b) Hydrological and stom related indicators 
sea ice retrei 
Slmdalul annual gkbsl 
mean sutfaw b m p n t u m  
fa) Natural 
frequency/ intensity 
storm frequency1 intensity 
Pigurc 17 Schematic diagnrn ofvariations in a) tempmwc: b) hydrological and storm- 
related indiumn from ptojexions of future &mate change with wuplcd atmosphere-ocean 
GCMs (from Chapter 9 of IPCC, 2001). 
- 0 1  
18M leMl to50 m 
Year 
F i m  18 Annual and pJobal mean tempamre anomaly (relarive to thc 188&1920 a v m )  from a suite of dimate s*mulation noerimenu 
wi& both natural and an;hropogcnic for&ng agents. T ~ C ' ~ ~  shading indicates the range s h n e d  by four indcpendcnt simulationsi the d linc 
indicates obmtions: a) Thc nanual forcing (mlar r volcanic emissions) experimcnrs produce a gradual warming to about 1960 followed by a 
l I 
t B M  TWO 1960 zOpo 
Y", 
(b) Anthropogenic 
(C) All fomings 
return to late 19" m~sy temperatures, consistent with the gradual change in solar forcing throughout the 20"iennuy and a resumption of 
volcanic activity during the put  few decades. b) The anthropogcnic e n h o u s e  gas + a e m h )  rum repreduce the wvming of the lasr three 
decades, but underestimate the utly centmywarming and do not adequately capture the slight woiing that o~curred bctwccn the two periods of 
rapid warming. c) The wmbined forcing tuns, on the other band, are able to reproduce much ofthe obmed  decadal scale variation in global 
mean temperature and are also able m capture with some fiddirythe large-scale spatial structure of the observed changs (from thesummary for 
Policy Makers of IPCC, 2001). 
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P i g w  19 Global mean surface air rempenture anomaly (relarivc ro ayex 1700 equilibrium) 
obtained from simulations using the UVic M System Model of intermediate wmplexiry. All 
model intcgntions s m e d  at yeat 1700. The obsetved tcmpenturc mtd is given in blue, 
while the model simulated change including all narural and anthropgcnic forcing is given in 
red. These are plotted in relation ro each other according to their 1961-1990 averages. The 
20h century sutface air temperature response of the W i c  model, driven by changes in 
individual forcings (either natud or anhpogenic), is also shown: gtcenhouse gases (omge); 
sulphare aerosols (purple); land-use change (pink); volcanic activity (green); solar inrensity 
(light blue); solar orbital (Miankovitch) forcing (black). 
SCIENCE AND POLICY 
-W 
In this paper the 200 yea history and 
science of global warming has been 
outlined. In particular, ir has been 
pointed out that the science is deeply 
rooted in the peer-rwinued literarure. 
Unfortunately, the media tend ro 
sensationalize the science, often leaving 
the general public confused. An example 
of this comes from the Victoria E m s  
Colonist which, on January 14, 2001, 
published a 'Top Story' on page A3 
headlined " S d y  WKI global 
warming." On January 23, 2001, only 
nine days later, the lead story on the 
front page was headlined "Global 
warming srum'ty grows." The average 
pcrson reading these pieces would think 
that scientific understanding is swinging 
like a pendulum from one extreme to 
the other. They would be entirely 
confused, and may wen dismiss the 
whole issue, since they would not have 
the benefit of reading the peer-reviewed 
literature from which the stories arose. 
Scientists are of course debating climate 
change in peer-reviewed, international 
journals. Yet this debate is not about if 
human-caused dimate change is 
happening - but rather how quickly, to 
what magnirude, and with what regional 
implications. 
This discussion has appealed to 
the findings of the latest IPCC report. 
The observed warming trend and its 
seasonal and large scale-geographical 
distribution is consistent with what 
wupled models have suggested should 
have occurred, and also what these 
same models project will occur more 
noticeably in the future. 
With respect to Canada, 
Figure 6d shows that there has been a 
strong warming trend in annual mean 
temperatures, especially during winter 
(Fig. 8a). Projections of future climate 
change all consistently show that 
warming will continue in the region, 
under all scenarios of future emissions 
that have been used co drive the coupled 
models. Most of Canada is projected to 
have greater-than-average warming in 
the summer and winter, for both the A2 
and B2 scenarios. Northern Canada is 
projened to have greater-than-avetage 
warming in the summer and much 
greater-than-average warming in the 
winter months, with precipitation 
increases occurring in both seasons. As 
such, the 1.4-5.8'C globally averaged 
warming pmjections by 2100 should be 
considered to be amplified over 
Canada. 
Futun dlrodms of daub 
noWPr 
In the IPCC Third Asswment Report, 
none of the international groups 
contributing projections of future 
climate had incorporated interactive 
terrestrial and oceanic carbon cycle 
models into their coupled models. 
Several international groups have 
subsequenrly made signifiunt advances 
in this regard and the fim projmions 
including interactive carbon cycle and 
dynamic termvial vegetation are 
beginning m appear. A major thrust of 
international coupled modelling effom 
over the next few years will be the 
development of a terrestrial and oceanic 
carbon cyde modelling capability for 
use in climate change projections on 
which policy will be based. 
In the IPCC feud assessment, 
l i l y  to occur in 2007, the leading 
climate modds will indude interactive 
terrestrial and ocean carbon cycles in 
which anthropogenic greenhouse gas 
and aerosol emissions, rather than 
concentration scenarios, will be 
specified. In addition, it is likely that 
these same models will allow both 
vegeration type and function to vary 
with the changing dimate, thereby 
allowing important biological feedbacks 
within rhe dimate system. The state of 
the art dimate models will also 
incorporate interactive atmospheric 
sulphur and ozone (tropospheric and 
stratospheric) cycles, which will allow 
for a more complete treatment of 
natural and anthropodenic radiative 
forcing of the climate system. 
In the IPCC fifth assessment, 
probably in ten yean time, one can 
envision that rather than specifying 
future emissions of atmospheric 
aerosols and greenhouse gases, the state- 
of-the-att models will calculate these 
emissions internally through the 
interaction of coupled climatelsocio- 
economic models. That is, emissions 
will be calculated internally under 
specified policy, technological, 
population growth and other socio- 
economic options. 
XlENTlFlC ClWLENCES 
Some degree of climate change is 
inevitable as the Earth system moves 
towards a ncw global radiative 
equilibrium under increased levcls of  
greenhouse gases. While the Kyoto 
Protocol represents a small step towards 
addressing the issue of climate change, 
it is only a start. In fact, if we wish to 
stabilize atmospheric CO2 levels at 3 4  
times preindustrial values, global 
anthropogenic emissions must be 
reduced by less than half of what they 
were in 1990 (IPCC, 2001). Meeting 
the required global reductions in fossil 
Fuel emissions presents numerous 
scientific challenges, yet at the same 
time presents an enormous economic 
opportunity. Our ability to reach and 
maintain a yet-to-be defined acceptable 
level of climate change will require the 
spawning of new energy technologies. 
The market for these technologies is 
global, the field is wide open, and every 
single individual on this planet is a 
potential customer. 
In addition to cutting CO2 
emissions at their source, both through 
slight changes in lifestyle as well as the 
development of new technologies, 
enhancing the natural carbon sinks may 
prove to be a viable and cost-effective, 
if only short term, approach CO 
mitigation. At the same time, regional 
adaptation strategies need to be 
developed for the change that is already 
in the pipeline. The science behind the 
projections of regional climate change is 
still in its infancy. There are large 
uncertainties in both downscaling global 
climate change projections onto sub- 
continental scales, as well as in the basic 
physics of processes (such as clouds and 
precipitation) that operate on these 
regional scales. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Over the course of the 20th century the 
globe has warmed by 0.6 + 0.2"C as a 
consequence of natural and 
anthropogenic changes in radiative 
forcing. If greenhouse gas emissions 
werc to be curtailed immediately, such 
that the atmospheric concentration of 
CO2 remained fmed at 1999 levels (368 
ppm), the Earth would still warm a 
further -0.5-C over the next several 
centuries (Weavcr et al., 2001) as it 
tries to equilibrate to the increased 
radiativc forcing. This follows from the 
slow response time of the ocean 
component of the climatc system to 
pcrturbations in radiative forcing. With 
this said, if emissions were to be 
stopped, natural carbon sinks, especially 
in the ocean, could potentially draw 
down and store a significant portion of 
past emissions. 
In a recent study, Ewen et al. (in 
press) found that the ocean had the 
capacity to eventually take up an 
additional 65-75% of the atmospheric 
CO,  increase when anthropogenic 
forcing was stopped. This reduced by 
about 5% for each 50 year period that 
anthropogenic emissions were 
maintained at a stabilized and elevated 
atmospheric greenhouse CO2 level. The 
results of this work clearly has 
encouraging policy implications with 
respect to future fossil fuel emissions. If 
we are able to reduce emissions in the 
near future, there is hope that the ocean 
can draw down a substantial portion of 
the atmospheric CO, solely through the 
solubility pump (the dissolution of CO, 
in water). In particular, 65-70% of all 
past emissions can be drawn down into 
the ocean. The longer it takes to reduce 
emissions, the less the ocean solubility 
pump is able to draw down. 
Nevertheless, uncertainties in natural 
carbon cycle feedbacks are large and are 
only just beginning to be examined by 
the scientific community. 
Much as the Kyoto Protocol 
requires countrics to consider the 
implications of their greenhouse gas 
emissions beyond their immediate 
national borders, reducing the 
uncertainties in climate change science 
requires scientists to transcend 
traditional disciplinary boundaries. 
Meeting these challenges will create new 
scientific opportunities, and from these 
opportunities we will determine what is 
an acceptable level of future change. 
There is a very real danger that 
Canadians will believe that the Kyoto 
Protocol, aimed at curbing global 
emissions of greenhouse gases, is the 
answer to climate change. I believe that 
Kyoto is only a small, yet important, 
first step on our road to a sustainable 
future no longer dependent on fossil 
fuels. Even if all countries meet their 
Kyoto targets, climate will be negligibly 
a e c t c d  over the rest of this ccntury. 
Canada, as a wealthy nation, has 
thc cconomic wherewithal to adapt to a 
changing climate. If we can adapt to 
climate change why should we worry? 
The answer is simple. There are large 
parts of the world which have neither 
the technological nor the economic 
ability to adapt to a changing climate. 
Couple this with the fact that the 
problem was caused by industrialized 
nations and you have sown the seeds of 
discontent. These seeds could grow to 
resentment and hostility or, if we take 
appropriate international steps to both 
mitigate climate change and assist non- 
industrialized nations in adapting to its 
effects, they could blossom into a 
mechanism for creating global stability. 
In short, dealing with climate change is 
about dealing with domestic and global 
security. 
The climate change we are in 
store for over the next few centuries will 
be larger and will occur faster than at 
any time in the last 10,000 years. While 
our pace of technological advance has 
historically been fast, it must remain 
faster than the pace at which climate 
will change in the future. Kyoto, and the 
required post-Kyoto agreements, might 
be the necessary incentives to ensure 
that these technological targets are met. 
Along with such steps by governments, 
individuals need to examine the hard 
choices that will lessen the impact of 
climate changc on future generations. 
The path to decarbonization of 
our global energy system has been in the 
works for centuries. With the discovery 
of coal, wood was replaced as the 
primary fuel of choice. Throughout the 
20dl century, the energy market share of 
coal declined as the share of other 
hydrocarbons picked up; first oil and 
then natural gas. Throughout this 
hydrocarbon age, the evolution from 
coal to oil to propane to methane was 
accompanied by a decline in the rario of 
carbon to hydrogen (CIH) on a per 
Volume 30 Number 3 
molecule basis: CIH=2 (Coal) t o  Cl 
H = l  (Oil) t o  CIH=0.375 (Propane) t o  
CIH= 0.25 (Methane - CH4) .  
W e  currently categorize the 
evolution o f  civilization in rerms o f  the 
history of technology use, moving us 
from the Stone Age, through the Bronze 
Age and  into the Iron Age. Today, in 
this Hydrocarbon Age, technology 
advance and  hence the advance of 
civilization is entirely dependent o n  
energy availability. T h e  natural evolution 
of the trend in decarbonization of our  
global energy system is a n  eventual C I H  
ratio of zero - pure hydrogen (H2). 
Th is  transition will mark the beginning 
of a new era in rhe history o f  
civilization: T h e  Hydrogen Age. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I a m  t o  both t h e  Killam 
Foundation and  the Canada Research 
Chair  program for providing both 
research support a n d  release time that 
allowed m e  ro write this review. I a m  
also grateful t o  Damon Matthews who 
produced Figure 19,  for discussions 
with Ned. Djilali, a n d  for comments 
Provided by Professor H. Dowlatabadi 
and  a n  anonymous reviewer. Figures 3 ,  
4, 6-13, 15-18 were reprinted with 
permission from the Intergovernmenral 
Panel o n  Climate Change. 
REFERENQS 
Arrhcnius, S., 1896, On the influence of 
carbonic acid in the air upon the 
tcmoeraturc of thc around: Thc London. 
tdlAhurph and i)uLltn Pht luwpht~~l  
t 4 ~ g u l n c  md lournal uiScen'c. 5'%,rr. 
p. i37-276. 
Briffa. K.R., 2000. Annual climate variability in 
the Holocene: incerprering the message of 
ancienr trees: Quaternary Science Reviews, 
v. 19. p. 87-105. 
Chrisrianson, G.E., 1999, Creenhaurc: The 
200-year srory of global warming: New 
York: Walker and Ca., 305 p. 
Clark, PU., Pirias, N.G., Stocker,T.F. and 
Weaver, AJ.. 2002. The role of thc 
rhcrmohaline circulation in abrupt climate 
changc. Nature, v 415, p. 863-869. 
Diamond. 1.. 1997, Guns, Germs, and Steel. 
The Fates of Human Societies: W.W. 
Norton and Co., New York, NY, 448 p. 
Ewen. T.L., Wcaver, A.J., and Eby, M., in press, 
Rcspansc of the inorganic ocean carbon 
cycle ro future warming in a coupled climate 
modcl: Armosphere-Ocean. 
Fourier, J.B.J., 1824, Rcmarqua gCntrala sur la 
tcmptnturc du globc terratrc et dcs 
emaces ~lanttaircs. Annalcs de chimie et dc 
physiqu;. v. 27, p. 136-167. 
Gelbspan, R ,  1997. The Heat is On: Addison- 
~ L l e y  Publishing Company, Inc., New 
York. 278 p. 
IPCC, 1996, Climate Change 1995 -The 
Science of Climare Change: Contribution of 
Working Group I ro theSccond Aseisment 
Rcpon of rhc Intergovernmental Pancl an  
Climzrc Change: Cambridge, England, 
Cambridge University Press. 
IPCC, 2000, Emissions Scenarios. A Spccial 
Rcpon of Working Group Ill of thc 
Intergavernmcnral Pancl on Climatc 
Change: Gmbridgc, England, Cambridge 
University Press. 
IPCC, 2001. Climatc Change 2001, The 
Scientific Basis. Contribution of Working 
Gmup I to thc Third Scientific Asxsment 
Reporr of thc Intcrgovcrnmental Panel an  
Climate Change: Cambridge, England, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Jones, PD., BritTa. K.R, Barnm, T.E. and 
S.EB. Ten, 1998: High-resolution 
pal-limatic records for che lu t  
millennium: inrcrprecauon, integration and 
comparison with General Circulation Model 
control run rempcntures Holocene, v. 8, 
p. 477-483. 
Knutti, R., Stockcr, T.F., Joas, F., and Plnnncr, 
G.-K., 2002, Constrains an  radiativc 
forcing and future climate changc from 
observations and climate model enrcmblcs: 
Nature, v. 416, p. 719-723. 
Manabc, S. and Weatherald, RT., 1967, 
Thermal equilibrium of the atmosphere with 
a given dirrribution of relarive humidity: 
Journal of rhc Atmospheric Sciences, v. 24, 
p. 241-259. 
Manley , G., 1952, Climate and the British 
Scene: Collins, London, 314 p. 
Mann, M.E., Bradley, R.S., and Hughcs, M.K., 
1999, Norrhcrn Hemisphere Tcmpcratures 
During rhe Past Millennium: Infcrcnca, 
Unccrtaintics, and Limitations: Geophysical 
Rerearch Lctrcn. v. 26, p. 759-762. 
Marthcwr. H.11.. Weaver, A.]., Eby. M.. and 
Mcissnrr. K.J.. 2003, Radiative forcing of 
climatc hy historical land cover changc: 
Geophysical Rrsrarch Letters, v. 30, no. 2. 
1055. doi:10.1029/2002GLO16098. 
National Research Council, 1979. CO, and 
Climatc: A Scientific Assessment: 
Washingron. D.C., National Academy Press. 
National Research Council, 1983, Changing 
Climate: Washingron, D.C., Narional 
Academy Press. 
National Research Council, in press. Climate 
Change Feedbacks, Charactcriring and 
Reducing Uncertainty: Washingron, D.C., 
National Academy Press. 
Pctit, ].R., Jouzel, J., kynaud, D., 
Barkov, N.I.. Barnola, ].-M,, Basile. I., 
Bendcn, M., Chap~l laz ,  J., Davis, M., 
Delayquc, G., Dclmonc, M,, 
Kotlyakov. V.M.. Lcgnnd, M,, 
Lipcnkov, V.Y.. Lorius, C., Ptpin, L., 
Ria. C., Salaman, E., and Sricvcnard, M., 
1999, Climate and aunosphcric history of 
che pasr 420,000 ynrs from thc Vosrok ice 
core, Anrarcuu: N~NIC,  v. 399, p. 429-436. 
ReveIIe R ,  and Sues, H., 1957, W n  
dioxide exchange between the atmosphere 
and the ocean and the question of an 
incr- of atmospheric CO2 during the past 
decades: Tellus, v. 9, p. 18-27. 
Stan, P.A., and Kctrlcborough, Jh. ,  2002, 
Origins and arimara of unceruinty in 
predictions of cwcnty-firsr century 
rcmpcracurc rise: Naturr, v. 416, p. 723- 
726. 
Scan, P.A., Tctt, S.F.B., Jones, G.S., Allcn, 
M.R, Mitchcll, J.F.B., and Jcnkins, GJ.,  
2000, External Control of 20th Ccntuty 
Tcmpcraturc by Natural and Anthmpogcnic 
Forcing: Science, v. 290, p. 2133-2137. 
Weaver, A.J., Eby. M,, Wtcbc, E.C., Bia, C.M.. 
D*, RB., Ewcn, 'EL., Fanning A.F., 
Holland, M.M.. MacFadrn, A.. Manhovs, 
H.D.. Meisner, K.J., Saenko. 0 . .  
Sdunircner, A.. Wang. H.. and Yoshimori. 
M,, 2001, The W i c  Earth System Climate 
Model: Modcl description, climatology and 
application ra past, present and furure 
climates: Atmosphere-Ocean, v. 39, p. 361- 
428. 
Wiglcy, T.M.L., 1998, The Kyoto Pror-l: 
CO2. CH, and climate implications: 
Geophysical Research Lctters, v. 25, 
p. 2285-2288. 
Zwiers, F.W.. 2002: The 20-year forecast: 
Nature, v. 416, p. 690-691. 
Accepted as revised 6 June 2003  
